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Finding safe MCP servers: permissions, prompt injection, vetting

How MCP servers can go wrong, from poisoned tool descriptions to over-broad tokens, and a short checklist for vetting one before you connect it.

Updated 2026-11-19. "(source N)" refers to the numbered list at the end.

Why this matters

An MCP server is code that sits between an AI model and your accounts. A good one saves hours. A bad one can read your files, leak your data, or take actions you never asked for.

The MCP spec is clear about this. It says tools amount to running arbitrary code, that a server's own description of its tools should not be trusted unless the server is, and that apps must ask the user before calling any tool (source 2). Anthropic, which runs a directory of connectors, says it reviews listings against its criteria but does not security-audit the servers (source 5).

Threat 1: prompt injection

Prompt injection is when text the model reads contains instructions that hijack it. It is the top risk on OWASP's list for AI apps (source 7). The text can arrive through an email, a web page, a support ticket or a tool result.

The UK's National Cyber Security Centre warns that this is not like SQL injection, which can be fully fixed. Language models cannot reliably tell instructions apart from data, so the risk can be reduced but perhaps never removed (source 8). Plan on the basis that some attacks will get through.

Threat 2: poisoned tools

Researchers at Invariant Labs showed a sneakier version aimed at MCP itself (source 3). A server's tool description, which the model reads but the user usually does not, can hide instructions.

Threat 3: the lethal trifecta

Developer Simon Willison names the most dangerous combination. An agent becomes easy to exploit when it has all three of these: access to private data, exposure to content an attacker can control, and a way to send data out (source 4). With all three, one malicious email can lead to your data being posted to a stranger's server.

Every MCP server you add may bring one of these. A web-fetch server brings untrusted content. A CRM server brings private data. An email server brings a way out. Check the combined set, not each server alone.

Threat 4: too much access

The MCP security guide warns against tokens with broad scopes like full access to every file or every database. If such a token leaks, the attacker gets everything at once (source 1). It recommends starting with minimal, read-only scopes and asking for more only when a specific action needs it.

Local servers carry their own risk. They run with the same rights as your user account. The guide asks apps to show the exact start command before installing one, and suggests running local servers in a sandbox with limited file and network access (source 1).

A vetting checklist

Before you connect a server, work through this list.

Safe habits once connected

None of this means you should avoid MCP. It means treating each server the way you would treat a new browser extension with access to your bank: useful, but only from a source you trust and with no more access than it needs.

Sources

Written by Agents Lookup in our own words. Facts come from these pages: